System Dynamics Analysis Method of Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Supervision of High-Speed Railway Operation Safety

On the issue of no-incentive restraint mechanism and the regulator not independent in the entrusted transportation management model of high-speed railways (HSR) in China, an evolutionary game model of the HSR operation safety supervision system has been established through the analysis of the current situation and principal-agent model of the system based on the optimization assumptions that enhance the status and authority of the HSR company. The system was composed of the HSR company, a third-party regulatory agency (RA), and commissioned railway bureau (RB). The results of the evolutionary game theory combined with system dynamics (SD) simulation revealed the behavioural characteristics and steady-state decision-making by the three parties in the system. The SD simulation results showed that eight pure strategy equilibrium solutions and two mixed strategy equilibrium solutions of the model did not comply with the evolutionary stable strategy. Under the initial strategy of any non-equilibrium solution, the game evolution process of both the HSR company and commissioned RB continually fluctuate; however, the safety regulation rate of the RA will always evolve towards the state of real-time supervision, indicating that the introduction of an independent third-party RA and a clear incentive restraint mechanism can improve the safety regulation rate of the HSR operations safety supervision system effectively.