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出租车驾驶员交通违法行为演化博弈模型

江欣国 周悦 夏亮 付川云

江欣国, 周悦, 夏亮, 付川云. 出租车驾驶员交通违法行为演化博弈模型[J]. 西南交通大学学报, 2019, 54(6): 1121-1128. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.0258-2724.20180531
引用本文: 江欣国, 周悦, 夏亮, 付川云. 出租车驾驶员交通违法行为演化博弈模型[J]. 西南交通大学学报, 2019, 54(6): 1121-1128. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.0258-2724.20180531
JIANG Xinguo, ZHOU Yue, XIA Liang, FU Chuanyun. Evolutionary Game Model of Traffic Violations among Taxi Drivers[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2019, 54(6): 1121-1128. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.0258-2724.20180531
Citation: JIANG Xinguo, ZHOU Yue, XIA Liang, FU Chuanyun. Evolutionary Game Model of Traffic Violations among Taxi Drivers[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2019, 54(6): 1121-1128. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.0258-2724.20180531

出租车驾驶员交通违法行为演化博弈模型

doi: 10.3969/j.issn.0258-2724.20180531
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金(71771191),中国博士后基金项目(2017T100710,2016M600748),中央高校基本科研业务费理工类科技创新项目(2682016CX052),四川省科技计划项目(2017ZR0209)
详细信息
    作者简介:

    江欣国(1975—),男,教授,博士,研究方向为道路交通安全,E-mail:xjiang@swjtu.edu.cn

  • 中图分类号: U491.4

Evolutionary Game Model of Traffic Violations among Taxi Drivers

  • 摘要: 为研究违法成本对出租车驾驶员实施违法行为的影响,根据驾照管理方式,对交通违法成本构成及其累积过程进行研究. 通过设置警戒分数线,将出租车驾驶员分为一般和临界两个状态,构建了不同执法策略条件下,出租车驾驶员与交通执法者间的演化博弈模型,并采用仿真手段模拟不同执法及驾照管理条件下,出租车驾驶员的违法策略变化情况. 研究结果显示:执法水平和驾照分扣除程度直接影响违法成本,并决定双方的演化均衡;交通管理者对临界驾驶员采取低于一般驾驶员约30%的执法概率即可达到类似执法效果,临界驾驶员执法成本更低;相同执法水平下,临界驾驶员违法概率低于一般驾驶员;记分周期(1 a)内,每天相同人数更换驾照时,遭交通处罚的一般驾驶员人数相比不更换驾照条件多约10%,且随时间推移人数持续增加. 相关改善措施可考虑调整执法策略或改变驾照更新制度,促使出租车驾驶员驾照资格从一般转入临界状态,有助于遏制其交通违法行为,降低交通执法成本.

     

  • 图 1  出租车驾驶员驾照资格转化过程

    Figure 1.  Transformation process of taxi driver’s license qualification

    图 2  3种初始概率下两类驾驶员违法策略演化

    Figure 2.  Traffic violation evolution of two types drivers based on different original strategies

    图 3  3种初始概率下两类驾驶员遭3次及以上的处罚人数

    Figure 3.  Number of two types of drivers punished at or more than three times under three conditions

    图 4  3种初始概率下两类驾驶员驾照分扣除的累计人数

    Figure 4.  Accumulated number of two types of drivers under three license points deduction conditions

    图 5  考虑单群体执法的策略演化

    Figure 5.  Strategy evolution considering single group enforcement

    图 6  驾照更换对每月遭处罚人数的影响

    Figure 6.  Influence of driving license replacement on monthly number of punished drivers

    图 7  驾照更换对进入临界状态人数的影响

    Figure 7.  Effect of driving license replacement on the number of critical drivers

    表  1  抽样调查结果

    Table  1.   Questionnaire Results

    统计结果日工作时间/h月净收入/元公司是否会二次罚款1 a 内可接受罚金/元1 a 内可接受累积扣分/分
    最大值146 50013 00012
    最小值72 00001001
    均值11.194 2440.334686.02
     注:“公司是否会二次罚款”中的“1”表示会二次处罚,“0”表示不会二次处罚.
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  2  出租车驾驶员与交通执法者博弈矩阵

    Table  2.   Game matrix of taxi dirvers and traffic enforcement men

    驾驶员策略交通执法者
    执法不执法
    一般驾驶员 违法 $\left(\left(B - {C_{\rm{O}}} - r{C_{\rm{T}}} - r{C_{\rm{E}}} - r{C_{\rm{A}}}\right)\right)$,$\left. r{C_{\rm{E}}} - A - I\right)$ $\left(B - {C_{\rm{O}}}\right.$,$\left. - I\right)$
    不违法 $(0$,$ - A)$ $(0$,$0)$
    临界驾驶员 违法 $( B - {C_{\rm{O}}} - r{C_{\rm{T}}} - r{C_{\rm{E}}} - r\alpha {C_{\rm{Q}}} - r\alpha {C_{\rm{C}}} - r{C_{\rm{A}}}$,$r{C_{\rm{E}}}{\rm{ + }}r\alpha {C_{\rm{Q}}} - A - I)$ $(B - {C_{\rm{O}}}$,$ - I)$
    不违法 $(0$,$ - A)$ $(0$,$0)$
    下载: 导出CSV
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出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  2018-06-28
  • 修回日期:  2018-07-20
  • 网络出版日期:  2018-09-12
  • 刊出日期:  2019-12-01

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