System Dynamics Analysis Method of Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Supervision of High-Speed Railway Operation Safety
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摘要: 针对我国高速铁路委托运输管理模式下，高铁运营安全监督系统存在监管机构不独立和考核奖惩措施不明确的问题，建立了高铁运营安全监督系统演化博弈模型. 该模型是通过分析系统现状和委托代理模式，基于增强高铁公司主体地位和权威性的优化假设条件下建立的，由高铁公司、第三方监管机构和委托路局三方组成，并通过演化博弈理论证明，结合系统动力学（system dynamic，SD）仿真，可以揭示高铁运营安全监督系统博弈各方进行决策的行为特征及其稳定状态. SD仿真结果表明：该模型的8个纯策略均衡解和2个混合策略均衡解都不是演化稳定策略均衡，在任意非均衡解初始策略下，高铁公司和委托路局的博弈演化过程虽然都出现了波动，但第三方监管机构的安全监管率将始终向实时监管的状态演化，说明通过引入第三方独立监管机构和明确安全监督检查考核奖惩措施，可以有效提高高铁运营安全监督系统的安全监管率.Abstract: On the issue of no-incentive restraint mechanism and the regulator not independent in the entrusted transportation management model of high-speed railways (HSR) in China, an evolutionary game model of the HSR operation safety supervision system has been established through the analysis of the current situation and principal-agent model of the system based on the optimization assumptions that enhance the status and authority of the HSR company. The system was composed of the HSR company, a third-party regulatory agency (RA), and commissioned railway bureau (RB). The results of the evolutionary game theory combined with system dynamics (SD) simulation revealed the behavioural characteristics and steady-state decision-making by the three parties in the system. The SD simulation results showed that eight pure strategy equilibrium solutions and two mixed strategy equilibrium solutions of the model did not comply with the evolutionary stable strategy. Under the initial strategy of any non-equilibrium solution, the game evolution process of both the HSR company and commissioned RB continually fluctuate; however, the safety regulation rate of the RA will always evolve towards the state of real-time supervision, indicating that the introduction of an independent third-party RA and a clear incentive restraint mechanism can improve the safety regulation rate of the HSR operations safety supervision system effectively.
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Key words:
- high-speed railway /
- operation safety supervision /
- system dynamics /
- game theory /
- principal-agent
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图 1 高铁运营安全监管组织架构
Figure 1. High-speed railway operation safety supervision organization structure
图 2 高铁运营安全监督系统委托-代理关系
Figure 2. Principal-agent relationship of operation safety supervision system of high-speed railway
图 3 优化的高铁运营安全监督系统委托-代理关系
Figure 3. Optimized principal-agent relationship of the operation safety supervision system of high-speed railway
图 4 高铁安全监督系统演化博弈SD模型
Figure 4. System dynamics model of high-speed railway safety supervision evolution game system
图 5 均衡解E12 策略下及发生突变的系统演化博弈过程
Figure 5. Game results under the equilibrium solution E12 strategy and mutation
表 1 高铁公司、监管机构和委托路局的收益矩阵
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the high-speed railway company，regulatory agencies，and commissioned railway bureau
策略 监督检查 不监督检查 路局按协议
安全投入路局有违法
违规行为路局按协议
安全投入路局有违法
违规行为严格监管 （– CS – BR – BE，BR + πR，πE – CE + BE） （PR – CS – （1 – RE）BE + REPE，
CR + πR – PR – WNB，（1 – RE）（BE +
πE – CE） + RE（πE – CE – PE））（0，πR，πE – CE） （– LS，πR + CR – WNB，πE – CE） 不监管 （PE – CS – BR，BR + πR，
πE – LE – PE）（PR + PE – CS，πR + CR – PR – WB，πBE + πE – PE – LE） （0，πR，πE – LE） （ – LS，CR + πR – WB，πBE +
πE – LE）
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表 2 仿真参数设置
Table 2. Simulation parameter setting
变量 变量含义 取值 变量 变量含义 取值 X 高铁公司监督检查率 [0，1] πR 委托路局的正常运输生产收益 11 Y 委托路局安全投入率 [0，1] CR 委托路局的安全投入成本（委托路局的违规操作收益） 5 Z 监管机构安全监管率 [0，1] WB 委托路局寻租成功时的总期望损失成本 3 CS 高铁公司监督检查成本 0.5 WNB 委托路局寻租失败时的总期望损失成本 2 LS 高铁公司忽视监督检查的期望损失 6 πE 第三方监管机构的监管收益 6 PR 高铁公司对委托路局的处罚 5 CE 第三方监管机构的监管成本 1 PE 高铁公司对第三方监管机构的处罚 3 LE 第三方监管机构忽视职责时的期望损失 1 BR 高铁公司对委托路局的奖励 3 RE 第三方监管机构的监管失误率 0.1 BE 高铁公司对第三方监管机构的奖励 2 πBE 第三方监管机构寻租成功时的收益 2
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