Analysis and Testing of Network Security for China Railway Communication Networks and Proposed Architecture Based on Trusted Computing
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摘要: 为了保障我国铁路通信系统的网络安全，提出了一种基于可信计算和软件定义网络（software-defined networking，SDN）相结合的铁路通信网安全体系架构. 首先，从我国铁路通信系统网络整体架构出发，采用故障树分析方法，以“恶意人员造成铁路业务中断”为故障树的顶事件，对系统所面临的网络安全风险进行分析；其次，进行了仿真测试，根据测试结果拟合了一个恶意人员针对铁路通信系统的威胁场景. 通过仿真测试结果和分析表明，本文所提出的架构可以更好地应对大规模、针对性强的网络攻击行为，从而保障和提高我国高速铁路通信网络安全.Abstract: China’s railway communication networks have been deployed throughout the country and have a complex infrastructure. A security architecture based on trusted computing and software-defined networking （SDN） has thus been proposed for ensuring the security of the railway communication system. The security risks for the complete network were investigated and tested through fault tree analysis. A simulation evaluation was subsequently performed and a threat scenario was simulated for analysing possible intrusions into the railway communication network. The obtained results show that the proposed architecture can help address various organised, targeted, and persistent network attacks.
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图 1 我国铁路通信系统网络总体架构
Figure 1. Infrastructure of China railway communication system networks
图 2 恶意人员造成铁路业务中断故障树
Figure 2. Fault tree analysis of railway communication service interrupt caused by a malicious attacker
图 3 恶意人员造成铁路通信网络中断故障树
Figure 3. Fault tree analysis of railway communication network interrupt caused by a malicious attacker
图 4 恶意人员造成铁路业务应用节点中断故障树
Figure 4. Fault tree analysis of railway application node interrupt caused by a malicious attacker
图 5 基于可信的铁路通信系统网络安全架构
Figure 5. Security architecture for railway communication system based on trusted computing
表 1 风险原因分类
Table 1. Classification of risk causes
分类 原因 说明 数据错误 {T2，T3，T10，T11} 数据被删除、伪造、重放和篡改导致数据错误，影响业务可用性 系统缺陷 {T0，T1，T4，T6，T8，C2，C3} 通信链路（有线、无线）、网络、操作系统、应用软件和运维支持系统
存在可被利用的脆弱性人为失误 {T5，T9} 人为的配置错误（如采用弱口令、点击不明链接等）；业务逻辑、
流程设计缺陷；安全策略缺失等冗余缺失 {T7} 没有冗余备份措施或失效 
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