Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supervision on Retrieval of Scrapped Automobile
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摘要: 建立了报废汽车回收过程中政府与汽车回收责任体的博弈模型,分析了博弈双方的稳定性条件,揭示博弈双方的行为特征及其对稳定状态的影响.结果表明:汽车回收责任体回收的成本与收益、政府对企业的奖惩力度以及政府监督成本是影响博弈结果的主要因素.Abstract: The evolutionary game model between the government and the retrieving enterprises was derived to analyze the stability conditions of the both parties and to reveal their behaviors and the effects on their stability. The factors directly affecting the game result are the cost and benefits of the retrieving enterprises,severity of the reward and penalty system,and the supervision cost of the government.
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Key words:
- scrapped automobile /
- retrieval /
- supervision /
- evolutionary game
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