Design of Flexible Mechanism for Multi-Agent Based on Virtual Enterprises
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摘要: 为降低多agent敏捷虚拟企业联盟契约的刚性,可引入激励约束机制.为进一步克服联盟契约的刚性,使激励机制充分发挥作用,应引人契约柔性机制.建立了基于动态稳定的联盟契约的激励约束机制模型和联盟契约柔性机制模型.利用这两个模型,通过观察各Agent的投资收益、贡献水平和动态调整分成比例,可有效降低多agent虚拟企业联盟契约的刚性.Abstract: Introduction of an incentive and constraint mechanism to the contract for a multi-agent based virtual enterprise is a measure to reduce the rigidity in the contract to a certain extent.To reduce the rigidity further,it is necessary to design a flexible mechanism.An incentive and constraint mechanism model and a flexible mechanism model were presented based on dynamic stability.A multi-agent based virtual enterprise could effectively reduce the rigidity using the two models and dynamically adjusting the distribution of profits according to the investment efficiency and contribution of each agent.
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