Pareto Improvement to Return Model in BOT Project
-
摘要: 在委托-代理理论框架下,建立了BOT项目中政府和项目公司双方的传统收益模型.对该模型的分析表明,代理人(项目公司)在特许权期内运营项目时不会选择对委托人(政府)最有利的行动,原因是在传统的收益模型中委托人向代理人支付报酬的合同不满足参与约束.对原收益模型进行帕累托改进后,使参与约束得到满足,进而在代理人的收益不受影响的同时,使代理人选择能增加委托人收益的行动.Abstract: A traditional return model of the BOT project was derived based on the principle-agent theory.Analysis of the mode indicates that the agent(project company) will not chose an action favorable to the principal(government).This is because the traditional contract does not meet the agent’s participation constraint.A Pareto improvement was made to the traditional return model,which makes the model meet the agent’s participation constraint.In the modified model,the agent will choose an action favorable to the principal,while its own return is not affected.
-
Key words:
- Pareto principle /
- Pareto improvement /
- BOT /
- concession term /
- principle-agent theory
-
YEO K T,TIONG L K R.Positive management of differences for risk reduction in BOT projects[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2000,18(4):257-265.[2] DAVID A K,FERNANDO P N.The BOT option,conflicts and compromises[J]. Energy Policy,1995,23(8):669-675.[3] KUMARASWAMY M M,ZHANG X Q.Governmental role in BOT-led infrastructure development[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2001,19(4):195-205.[4] LIN Mincheng.Contract design of private infrastructure concessions[D]. Berkeley:University of California,2000.[5] 赵立力,谭德庆,黄庆.BOT项目的可控制风险研究[J]. 中国管理科学,2005,13(5):39-43.ZHAO Lili,TAN Deqing,HUANG Qing.Research on controllable risk in BOT projects[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science,2005,13(5):39-43.[6] 杨宏伟,何建敏,周晶.在BOT模式下收费道路定价和投资的博弈决策模型[J]. 中国管理科学,2003,11(2):30-33.YANG Hongwei,HE Jianmin,ZHOU Jing.Game decision making model on toll road pricing and investment under a BOT scheme[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science,2003,11 (2):30-33.[7] 杨宏伟,周晶,何建敏.基于博弈论的交通BOT项目特许权期的决策模型[J]. 管理工程学报,2003,17(3):93-95.YANG Hongwei,ZHOU Jing,HE Jianmin.Decision making model on concession term for traffic BOT project on the basis of game theory[J]. Journal of Engneering Management,2003,17(3):93-95.[8] HO S P.Real options and game theoretic valuation,financing and tendering for investments on build-operate-transfer projects[D]. Urbana-Champaign:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,2001.[9] YANG H,MENG Q.Highway pricing and capacity choice in a road network under a build-operate-transfer scheme[J]. Transportation Research,2000,34A:207-222.[10] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M]. 上海:上海人民出版社,1996:431-440.
点击查看大图
计量
- 文章访问数: 1037
- HTML全文浏览量: 55
- PDF下载量: 391
- 被引次数: 0