The Minimal Winning Coalition of Enterprises in Competition

ZHANG Shu-yi; LIXiao-long; WUZhen-ye

Volume 15 Issue 3

Jun. 2002

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Article Contents

Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University > 2002 > 15(3): 305-308.

ZHANG Shu-yi, LIXiao-long, WUZhen-ye. The Minimal Winning Coalition of Enterprises in Competition[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2002, 15(3): 305-308.

Citation:

ZHANG Shu-yi, LIXiao-long, WUZhen-ye. The Minimal Winning Coalition of Enterprises in Competition[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2002, 15(3): 305-308.

ZHANG Shu-yi, LIXiao-long, WUZhen-ye. The Minimal Winning Coalition of Enterprises in Competition[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2002, 15(3): 305-308.

Citation:

ZHANG Shu-yi, LIXiao-long, WUZhen-ye. The Minimal Winning Coalition of Enterprises in Competition[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2002, 15(3): 305-308.

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The Minimal Winning Coalition of Enterprises in Competition

Publish Date: 25 Jun 2002

Abstract

Abstract

The minimalwinning coalition,S, of enterprises in competition ofthe setVsis proved, inwhich the revenue of the members who do not belong toSis equal to 0.Vsis analyzed with some examples discussed in the aspects of the size of strategic coalitions, allocation of benefits among the members, the opportunistic behaviors ofthe members and the compensation tothosewho havewithdrawn. Coalitions do not necessarily mean monopoly. Redistribution of available resources not only benefits enterprises, but improves the social welfare
- game theory,
- competition,
- minimal wining coalition