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Volume 19 Issue 6
Dec.  2006
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Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University  > 2006  >  19(6): 764-768.
HAN Jianjun, CHENG Y, GUO Yaohuang. Side Payment Mechanism for Design Outsourcing under Incomplete Contract[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2006, 19(6): 764-768.
Citation: HAN Jianjun, CHENG Y, GUO Yaohuang. Side Payment Mechanism for Design Outsourcing under Incomplete Contract[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2006, 19(6): 764-768.
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Side Payment Mechanism for Design Outsourcing under Incomplete Contract

  • Received Date: 22 Mar 2005
  • Publish Date: 25 Dec 2006
    Abstract
  • To increase the profit of project owners,a side payment mechanism was proposed for a design outsourcing system composed of one project owner and two design contractors.The influences of the proposed mechanism on the profit of the project owner under an incomplete contract was analyzed using game theory and the principle of information economics.It was found that,the degree of efforts by the winner contractor is positively proportional to the amount of bonus offered by the project owner to the winner contractor,and negtively proportianal to the difference of the evaluation of the design quality by the project owner from the real design quality.However,if a owner uses the side payment mechanism depends on the value of the design and compensation and punishment coefficients.

     

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