Signaling Game of the Chinese Security Market Structure
after the Introduction of QFII System

ZHOUJie; WANGXing-yu; YAOHong-xin

Volume 16 Issue 3

Jun. 2003

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Article Contents

Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University > 2003 > 16(3): 363-366.

ZHOUJie, WANGXing-yu, YAOHong-xin. Signaling Game of the Chinese Security Market Structureafter the Introduction of QFII System[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2003, 16(3): 363-366.

Citation:

ZHOUJie, WANGXing-yu, YAOHong-xin. Signaling Game of the Chinese Security Market Structure after the Introduction of QFII System[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2003, 16(3): 363-366.

ZHOUJie, WANGXing-yu, YAOHong-xin. Signaling Game of the Chinese Security Market Structureafter the Introduction of QFII System[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2003, 16(3): 363-366.

Citation:

ZHOUJie, WANGXing-yu, YAOHong-xin. Signaling Game of the Chinese Security Market Structure after the Introduction of QFII System[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2003, 16(3): 363-366.

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Signaling Game of the Chinese Security Market Structure after the Introduction of QFII System

Publish Date: 25 Jun 2003

Abstract

Abstract

Based on the analysis of the structural changes to be resulted from the introduction of QFII into China, the signaling game model forQFII and DII (Domestic Institutional Investors) is proposed. With the strong abilities to analyze security markets, abundant information and finacial resources, QFII will become the leader in the Chinese security market. Under the influences of QFII, the investment philosophy of Chinese investors will change from fund driven to value driven.
- game playing,
- Nash equilibrium,
- security market,
- FQII,
- DII,
- PI