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LIU Wenbin, FAN Pingzhi, LI Yukai, SUN Wenxin, WANG Xi, MENG Hua. Intelligent and Interpretable Detection of Electromagnetic Leakage Sources Based on Active Feature Excitation[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.0258-2724.20240561
Citation: LIU Wenbin, FAN Pingzhi, LI Yukai, SUN Wenxin, WANG Xi, MENG Hua. Intelligent and Interpretable Detection of Electromagnetic Leakage Sources Based on Active Feature Excitation[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.0258-2724.20240561

Intelligent and Interpretable Detection of Electromagnetic Leakage Sources Based on Active Feature Excitation

doi: 10.3969/j.issn.0258-2724.20240561
  • Received Date: 01 Nov 2024
  • Rev Recd Date: 01 Jul 2026
  • Available Online: 10 Nov 2026
  • To address the challenges of detecting electromagnetic leakage signals and assessing the security of leakage sources in the presence of multiple sources, harmonics, and interference, a highly interpretable security assessment scheme integrating active excitation and intelligent detection was proposed. First, an association model featuring active excitation and intelligent feature recognition was established to transform complex leakage source detection problems into quantifiable communication feature recognition tasks. Software programs actively called device interfaces to construct test signals with modulation features, thus enhancing the detectability and interpretability of leakage signals. Next, a convolutional neural network (CNN) was used for first-level classification to filter out clearly irrelevant signals, while the YOLOv5s model was employed for second-level classification in conjunction with high-resolution joint time-frequency feature representations to automatically select bounding boxes and extract target signals. The experimental results show that this method is suitable for typical scenarios such as electromagnetic leakage from serial ports and display cables. Active excitation based on a collaborative mode improves recognition accuracy by 6% compared with passive detection. The method effectively detects target signals in different scenarios, including normal conditions, the presence of multiple background signals, and weak target signals. In particular, the detection rate of harmonic signals generated by active excitation of display cables reaches 100%. The proposed method addresses the shortcomings of traditional passive electromagnetic leakage detection, such as poor generalization, low detection efficiency, and insufficient interpretability. This method provides a new technical approach to screening electronic devices for electromagnetic information leakage risks and evaluating device security, while also serving as an important reference for the practical implementation of cybersecurity detection and protection.

     

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